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THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF COVID-19
Ana Santos Rutschman*
This chapter describes and analyzes intellectual property issues arising during the race to
develop new treatments, vaccines and other medical technologies needed to address the public
health problems posed by COVID-19. The chapter highlights two contrasting dimensions of the
pandemic: on the one hand, the persistence of siloed approaches to R&D, technology transfer and
allocation of health goods; and on the other, the emergence of countervailing collaborative efforts
seeking to offset the progressive commodification of public health goods, as well as overly
proprietary traits of current innovation regimes.
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I. THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The response to COVID-19 is indissolubly tied to intellectual property. In an increasingly
globalized world in which infectious disease pathogens travel faster and wider than before, the
development of vaccines, treatments and other forms of medical technology has become an
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, Center for Health Law Studies, Center for
International and Comparative Law. S.J.D., LL.M., Duke Law School. This chapter benefited from early-stage
(virtual) discussions at the Singapore Management University Conference on Global Public-Private Law
Approaches to the Covid-19 Pandemic and at the summer workshop series at Saint Louis University School of Law.
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integral part of public health preparedness and response frameworks.1 The development of these
technologies, and to a certain extent the allocation and distribution of resulting outputs, is informed
by intellectual property regimes. These regimes influence the commitment of R&D resources,
shape scientific collaborations and, in some cases, may condition the widespread availability of
emerging technologies. As seen throughout this chapter, COVID-19 has exposed the shortcomings
of ingrained reliance on intellectual property as a channel for the production and dissemination of
medical technologies needed to address the problems posed by pandemics and epidemics. At the
same time, COVID-19 has brought new life to countervailing efforts to explore legal and policy
mechanisms to potentially offset some of the problems posed by the pervasiveness of, and
shortcomings associated with, intellectual property dynamics.
In tracing the dual ways in which intellectual property has affected preparedness for, and
the response to, COVID-19, this chapter highlights three features of contemporary intellectual
property regimes and examines their impact on innovation(s) needed to address public health
crises. First, it explores the incentives function of patent law and policy, which places considerable
emphasis on market-driven investment in R&D on medical technologies. In so doing, intellectual
property becomes one of the driving forces of the commodification of goods vaccines, drugs or
ventilator parts, for example which are best understood as public health goods.
Second, the chapter illustrates how intellectual property has reinforced an ethos of siloed
R&D, as illustrated by the COVID-19 vaccine race, which at the time of writing includes hundreds
of separate vaccine development projects.2 These siloes further extend into the allocative domain:
with the development of medical technologies now largely steeped in proprietary frameworks,
several countries have resumed the practice of reserving significant amounts of emerging
technologies for their domestic populations,3 thus curtailing the possibility of equitable
transnational approaches to a global public health crisis. This approach is commonly known in the
field of vaccines as vaccine nationalism.

4

Nationalism skews the distribution of medical

technologies developed during a pandemic, reducing opportunities for transnational coordination

1

See e.g. MILKEN INST., COVID-19 Treatment and Vaccine Tracker, infra note XX, (listing over 200 COVID-19
vaccine projects and over 300 COVID-19 treatment projects as of Aug. 25, 2020) (last accessed Aug. 25, 2020).
2
Id., ib. See also infra, Part III.A.
3
Infra, Part III.C.
4
See e.g. Ana Santos Rutschman, The Reemergence of Vaccine Nationalism, GEO. J. INT L. AFF. ONLINE (Jul. 3,
2020).
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and, as seen below, tendentially limiting access to these technologies by populations in
economically disadvantaged parts of the world.
The chapter ends nonetheless on a positive note, as COVID-19 has also made it abundantly
clear that the legal infrastructure needed to address many of these problems is already in place.
Early in the pandemic, several countries signaled that they would rely on intellectual property
mechanisms to ensure broad and equitable access to medical technologies developed during (and
possibly after) the pandemic, such as vaccines and treatments for COVID-19. These mechanisms
embody different types of commitments to share intellectual property, data and knowledge.5 At
the allocative level, a significant number of countries joined an ad hoc vaccine distribution facility
coordinated by Geneva-based international organizations. These efforts, albeit nascent and, in
many cases, likely transient nature, constitute meaningful steps towards a better innovation
ecosystem for medical technologies needed to prevent and respond to future pandemic.

II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BEFORE A PANDEMIC
An often-cited purpose of intellectual property is its incentives function.6 Patent rights, in
particular, are partly regarded as catalysts for investment in areas traditionally considered risky
and time- or resource-intensive.7 Yet, literature and practice have long identified a growing number
of areas in which this proposition does not fully account for current dynamics in innovation
processes and the motivations of R&D players.8
Many of health goods needed for pandemic preparedness and response are among those
that tend to fare poorly if their development and production is primarily dependent on intellectual

5

These commitments were undertaken both by countries (C-TAP) and institutions, including private-sector R&D
players (Open COVID-19 Pledge). See infra, Parts IV.A and IV.B.
6
See generally Stephen M. Maurer, Intellectual Property Incentives: Economics and Policy Implications, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (ROCHELLE DREYFUSS & JUSTINE PILA, EDS.) (2018). See
also Adrian Towse, A Review of IP and Non-IP Incentives for R&D for Diseases of Poverty. What Type of
Innovation is Required and How Can We Incentivise the Private Sector to Deliver It?, Final Report for the WHO
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (2005).
7
See e.g. Henry G. Grabowski et al., The Roles of Patents and Research and Development Incentives in
Biopharmaceutical Innovation, HEALTH AFF. (2015).
8
See e.g. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the
Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437 (2010); Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual
Property Law: Open Science in Influenza, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539 (2017).
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property incentives or other forms of market-driven forces.9 Some of these goods might be
scientifically complex and challenging to produce

for instance, a vaccine targeting HIV has yet

to be developed, in spite of long-lasting R&D efforts

while others constitute relatively simple

forms of technology as is the case of ventilators, which were in short supply during the COVID19 pandemic and for which there have been shortages in national stockpiles before pandemics
occur.10
Because intellectual property incentives may strongly condition funding for R&D, some of
these goods may remain undeveloped (or insufficiently developed) before a large-scale public
crisis occurs.11 This happens if the public health value of a particular good is hard to estimate, or
if the anticipated return-on-investment is estimated as being insufficiently attractive from an
economic perspective.12 Preventatives like vaccines, which embody both of these problems,
illustrate this dissociation between market incentives (including intellectual property) and public
health goals. Vaccines are critical for the prevention of outbreaks of infectious diseases, yet their
successful deployment translates into a non-event, or a limited public health crisis. Both outcomes
are hard to quantify from the perspective of savings to health systems.13 At the same time, most
vaccine manufacturers do not expect significant return-on-investment on vaccines targeting
emerging pathogens.14 While there is a strong patenting culture in the field of vaccines as a
whole,15 the prospect of being granted a patent appears to be of limited importance in terms of
catalyzing investment in pre-outbreak vaccine R&D.16
Dissociations between R&D priorities and public health imperatives tend to be cured (or
at least lessened) by the occurrence of a pandemic or epidemic.17 COVID-19 has illustrated this
phenomenon in the form of concomitant R&D races to develop diagnostics, vaccines, treatments
9

See Ana Santos Rutschman, IP Preparedness of Outbreak Diseases, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1200 (2018); Rutschman,
The Intellectual Property of Vaccines: Takeaways from Recent Infectious Disease Outbreaks, 118 MICH. L. REV.
ONLINE 170 (2020); Yaniv Heled et al., The Problem with Relying on Profit-Driven Models to Produce Pandemic
Drugs, __ J. L. & BIOSCI. __ (forthcoming 2020).
10
See e.g. Hsin-Chan Huang et al., Stockpiling Ventilators for Influenza Pandemics, 23 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 914 (2017).
11
See Rutschman, IP Preparedness, supra note 9.
12
See Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines, supra note 9.
13
Id., ib. See also Q. Claire Xue & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy and the Market for Vaccines, __ J.
L. & BIOSCI. __ (forthcoming 2020).
14
Id., ib.. But see Ana Santos Rutschman, Property and Intellectual Property in Vaccine Markets, __ TEXAS A&M
PROP. J. __ (forthcoming 2020) (describing examples of commercially successful vaccines).
15
See Ana Santos Rutschman, The Vaccine Race in the 21st Century, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 729 (2019).
16
See Rutschman, IP Preparedness, supra note 9.
17
Id., ib.
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and other medical technologies. As these races unfold, the imprints of intellectual property are
visible across different domains. The following section explores this shift in R&D approaches in
the context of COVID-19, and highlight the persistence of proprietary approaches to the
development, production and distribution of health goods needed during a pandemic.

III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE SILO CULTURE DURING A PANDEMIC
The COVID-19 pandemic ushered in a seemingly global race to develop treatments,
vaccines and several other types of medical technologies. Yet, in spite of extraordinary goodwill
and resource commitment towards expedited R&D, many of the efforts to produce these
technologies still took place in siloed environments. While a pandemic or other form of large-scale
public health crisis may temporarily solve some of the incentives and funding shortcomings
registered in pre-outbreak periods, it does not fundamentally change traditional R&D dynamics.
In particular, it does not do away with the siloed nature of R&D processes leading to the production
of goods needed to respond to a borderless public health problem. This, in turn, breeds instances
of duplication, secrecy and lack of collaboration, active non-cooperation and inequitable allocation
of R&D outputs.

A. DUPLICATION, PROPRIETARY R&D AND AFFORDABILITY ISSUES
As an illustration of the siloed nature of pandemic R&D, consider the case of vaccines.
COVID-19 unleashed the most densely populated vaccine race in history: by late summer 2020,
there were over 200 discrete vaccine development projects across the world.18 These projects
varied in developmental stage, ranging from pre-clinical studies to phase II and III clinical trials.19
As a general rule, a plethora of scientific approaches
numerous players

combined with the influx of

to a traditionally underpopulated and underfunded field of R&D constitutes a

welcome development. However, COVID-19 triggered what is arguably an overpopulation of the
R&D field. Governments quickly decided to prioritize a small number of vaccine candidates,

18

MILKEN INST., COVID-19 Treatment and Vaccine Tracker, https://covid-19tracker.milkeninstitute.org (listing 203
vaccine projects as of Aug. 21, 2020) (last accessed Aug. 25, 2020).
19
Id., ib.
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funneling public funding largely to a small number of selected candidates. For instance, in the
United States, Operation Warp Speed had narrowed down the field to 5 vaccine candidates by
early June 2020.20
That such a narrowing down of priority vaccine candidates should occur is inevitable given
both the nature of pharmaceutical R&D and funding constraints. Nonetheless, the enormous
dispersion of resources and R&D attention during the COVID-19 vaccine race with the inevitable
lack of coordination and duplication of efforts it entails

also speaks to systemic shortcomings in

the development and production of health goods in periods of crisis.21 R&D performed in response
to pandemics or epidemics largely magnifies the structure and dynamics of standard drug
development, which is largely firm or consortia-specific, as well as based on patent-driven
innovation processes. 22 As such, while a pandemic temporarily triggers a spike in R&D funding
and a compression of R&D timelines, these are likely to result in overpopulated vaccine or drug
races that lead to wasteful duplication.
Concerns with duplication are not exclusive to vaccines. For instance, the race to develop
treatments for COVID-19 was also unusually populated, in terms of the number of R&D players
and products, as well as temporally. In late summer 2020, there were over 300 discrete treatment
development projects, from antivirals to monoclonal antibodies and plasma products.23
The duplication problem is further compounded by a general lack of collaboration among
players participating in different R&D projects. Data, know-how and other forms of knowledge
are not shared universally or made available in meaningful ways, and in some cases

including

the manufacture of goods critical for pandemic response and preparedness like certain vaccines
can easily be kept secret.24 In sum, R&D in a pandemic continues to follow proprietary models of
innovation instead of tendentially collaborative approaches.

20

U.S. DEP T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, Fact Sheet: Explaining Operation Warp Speed (Jun. 26, 2020); Stephanie
Soucheray, Operation Warp Speed Names 5 COVID-19 Vaccine Candidates, CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE
RESEARCH & POL Y (Jun. 4, 2020).
21
WHO Blueprint.
22
See Heled et al., supra note 9.
23
MILKEN INST., COVID-19 Treatment and Vaccine Tracker, https://covid-19tracker.milkeninstitute.org (listing 316
treatment projects as of Aug. 21, 2020) (last accessed Aug. 25, 2020).
24
See W. Nicholson Price II et al., Knowledge Transfer for Large-Scale Vaccine Manufacturing, SCI. (Aug. 21,
2020).
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While problems of duplication and lack of collaboration are not solely attributable to the
prevalence of an intellectual property-based R&D culture,25 they denote a certain generalized
complacency with the commodification of vaccines, treatments and other public health goods. This
commodification extends beyond the domain of R&D. Once developed and authorized or approved
by regulatory agencies like the U.S. Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicines
Agency, these goods may be made available in ways that effectively exclude some indicated
populations from accessing them.26 Early on in the COVID-19 pandemic there were concerns with
that excessive pricing of emerging vaccines and treatments, especially in the United States.
The first red flag happened in February 2020, when Secretary of Health and Human
Services Alex Azar publicly stated that the government would not guarantee that COVID-19
vaccines would be priced affordably in the United States.27 Secretary Azar explained the position
of the government by alluding to a version of the incentives narrative alluded to in the previous
section: We can t control that price [of COVID-19 vaccines] because we need the private sector
to invest.

28

It should be noted that there are multiple legal mechanisms that would allow the
government to guarantee the affordability of COVID-19 vaccines and drugs. Inventions that
receive federal funding, as was the case of remdesivir, are subject to march-in rights, which allow
funding agencies to grant a license to other drug manufacturers in order to alleviate health or
safety needs not reasonably satisfied by the patent holder.29 Recently, scholars have made the
case that provisions regulating government use of patented technologies
1498

namely 28 U.S.C. §

can and should be used by the government to make or otherwise obtain a generic version

of an excessively priced patented drug.30 As Hannah Brennan and colleagues have noted:
The government may negotiate a license in the shadow of its § 1498
power. Alternatively, the government may simply make or purchase
25

See e.g. Ana Santos Rutschman, The Mosaic of Coronavirus Vaccine Development: Systemic Failures in Vaccine
Innovation, COLUM. J. INT LT AFF. (Mar. 21, 2020) (noting the existence of governance deficits in
biopharmaceutical innovation systems ).
26
The ability
27
See Nicole Wetsman, Health Secretary Alex Azar Won t Promise that a Coronavirus Vaccine Would be
Affordable, VERGE (Feb. 27, 2020).
28
Id., ib.
29
35 U.S.C. § 203. See also Ryan Whalen, The Bayh Dole Act & Public Rights in Federally Funded Inventions:
Will The Agencies Ever Go Marching In?, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 1083 (2015).
30
28 U.S.C. § 1498; Hannah Brennan et al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government
Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J. L. & TECH 275, 301-302 (2017). See also Charles Duan & Christopher J. Morten,
Who s Afraid of Section 1498? A Case for Government Patent Use in Pandemics and Other National Crises (on file
with author).
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the patented invention, leaving the patent holder to sue for damages
if it is dissatisfied with the compensation offered. The present
statute, like the 1910 Act, provides the only remedy available to a
patent holder is reasonable and entire compensation; the patent
holder may not seek injunctive relief.31
There are also legal mechanisms unrelated to intellectual property that would enable the
government to promote the affordability of drugs, vaccines and other emerging products needed
to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. In March 2020, the United States government used the
Defense Production Act (DPA) to compel General Motors to start producing ventilators.32 Many
commentators argued that the government should use this pathway more extensively to obtain a
broad range of products, from tests to N95 masks, and potentially beyond.33 So far, however, the
government has not done so.
The second red flag in this area occurred when prices were publicized for the first drug
indicated for the treatment of COVID-19, an antiviral called remdesivir.34 In June 2020, Gilead
the pharmaceutical company holding patent rights over remdesivir

announced that a full course

of treatment (which takes place over five days) would cost $3,120 to Medicare, Medicaid and
private insurers in the United States.35 This price is 33% higher than the one charged to
governments in other developed countries

which will pay $2,340, the same price tag supported

in the United States by the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Indian Health Service, a
division of the Department of Health and Human Services.36 For developing countries, the
company announced it would sell remdesivir at a substantially lower yet unspecified price.37
Both instances

the general lack of a guarantee of affordability of COVID-19 vaccines

and the specific price tag for a COVID-19 treatment, considered steep by many commentators
illustrate one of the most significant problems associated with the ongoing commodification of
public health goods. As R&D processes and distribution of these goods have been largely

31

Brennan et al., ib.
See Aishvarya Kavi, Virus Surge Brings Calls for Trump to Invoke Defense Production Act, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 22,
2020).
33
Id., ib.
34
See Gina Kolata, Remdesivir, the First Coronavirus Drug, Gets a Price Tag, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 29, 2020).
35
See Matthew Herper, Gilead Announces Long-Awaited Price for Covid-19 Drug Remdesivir, STAT (Jun. 29,
2020),
36
Id., ib.
37
See Hannah Denham et al., Gilead Sets Price of Coronavirus Drug Remdesivir at $3,120 as Trump
Administration Secures Supply for 500,000 Patients, WASH. POST (Jun. 29, 2020).
32
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subsumed into overly proprietary rights frameworks, public interest considerations have been
eroded

namely the public interest in broad, affordable access to vaccines, drugs and other goods

needed to address the pandemic.

B. PROPRIETARY RIGHTS AND NON-COOPERATIVE BEHAVIORS
Intellectual property may leave a different type of imprint on the response to a pandemic.
COVID-19 provided an illustration of the possible chilling effects of a culture that places too much
emphasis on the dynamics of intellectual property rights in the face of a situation of dire public
health crisis.
Consider the following case. A hospital in Brescia, one of the Italian cities the most affected
by the COVID-19 outbreak, was rapidly going through its stock of valves needed to connect
patients to ventilators.38 After being unable to acquire replacement valves from the original
manufacturer, the hospital turned to local engineers who were able to reverse engineer the valves
and create a 3D-printable prototype, even though the original manufacturing company refused to
share the digital files containing the instructions to print the valves.39 Through a partnership with
local owners of 3D printers, the engineers were able to print 100 valves in a single day.40 Moreover,
while a valve from the original manufacturer had a price tag of over $10,000, the locally 3Dprinted valves were produced at the cost of just over one dollar.41 The partnership, however,
refused to share the files containing instructions to print the valves with other companies, citing
concerns about intellectual property liability for such distribution.42
This example illustrates how a web of intellectual property rights in an unsettled area of
the law can detrimentally affect the use of life-saving medical devices during a pandemic. It is
possible

in fact, likely

that several intellectual property violations occurred throughout the

process that delivered valves to an overburdened hospital. These violations include the creation

38

Dinusha Mendis et al., 3D Printing: How an Emerging Technology May Help Fight a Pandemic, IPR INFO (Feb.
25, 2020).
39
Id., ib. See also Anas Essop, Hospital in Italy Turns to 3D Printing to Save Lives of Coronavirus Patients, 3D
PRINTING INDUSTRY (Mar. 18, 2020), https://3dprintingindustry.com/news/hospital-in-italy-turns-to-3d-printing-tosave-lives-of-coronavirus-patients-169136/
40
Mendis et al., supra note 38.
41
Id., ib.
42
Id., ib.
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and use of the digital file, the printing of the valves and the printed valves. Had the engineers
shared the files containing instructions for the 3D printing of the valves, further violations would
in all likelihood have occurred.43
Currently, there is no legal mechanism to expeditiously compel transfers of intellectual
property during public health crises.44 Similarly, defenses available in other areas of the law, such
as the necessity defense or self-defense, are not recognized in intellectual property theory and
law.45 While these problems remain unaddressed for the time being, the COVID-19 pandemic has
prompted the development and implementation of several initiatives that seek to minimize some
of the siloed effects of our patent-centric R&D culture

the chapter turns to these efforts in Part

IV, describing the patent pool created by the World Health Organization and the Open COVID-19
Pledge.
C. INEQUITABLE ALLOCATION OF RESULTING GOODS
Pandemics pose global public health problems. Treatments, vaccines and other medical
technologies emerging from pandemic-induced R&D races may nonetheless be allocated in ways
that are geographically and economically skewed.
No other area embodies this phenomenon more saliently than the development of COVID19 vaccines

to the point that the expression vaccine nationalism is now firmly embedded into

the popular discourse.46 Vaccine nationalism can be defined as efforts to influence the allocation
of newly developed vaccines, or first batches thereof, to the detriment
other, generally poorer countries.

often the exclusion

of

47

During the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, several developed countries moved to
reserve large numbers of vaccine doses for their domestic populations.48 They have done so by
entering into contractual agreements

often called pre-production orders

with pharmaceutical

43

Id., ib.
Rutschman, Vaccine Race, supra note 9.
45
But see Heled et al., The Need for the Tort Law Privileges of Self-Defense and Necessity in Intellectual Property
Law, CHI. U. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2021).
46
See e.g. Adam Taylor, Why Vaccine Nationalism is Winning, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/09/03/why-coronavirus-vaccine-nationalism-is-winning/
47
Sam F. Halabi & Ana Santos Rutschman, Viral Sovereignty and Vaccine Nationalism: Constructing the Post
COVID-19 Vaccine International Order __ (forthcoming) (draft on file with author).
48
See Rutschman, The Reemergence of Vaccine Nationalism, supra note 4.
44
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companies working on vaccine candidates in the more advanced stages of the R&D pipeline.49 By
mid-August 2020, the United Kingdom The United Kingdom had placed orders for 340 million
doses of vaccine, becoming the largest per-capita buyer in the world of COVID-19 vaccines.50 The
United States had placed orders with at least six vaccine manufacturers for 800 million doses of
vaccine.51 Overall, by late summer 2020, developed countries had placed pre-purchase order for
over two billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines.52
At first blush this might appear consistent with contemporary notions of sovereignty and
domestic public health agendas. In practice, unfettered allocation of vaccines through bilateral
channels

such as pre-purchases contracts between governments and pharmaceutical companies

is bound to result in inequitable allocation of vaccines.
A recent study conducted by the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI)
calculated that global manufacturing capacity for COVID-19 vaccines is between two and four
million doses 2-4 billion doses by the end of 2021.53 Given this estimate, contract bilateralism is
likely to result in a disproportionate allocation of the first batches of emerging vaccines to countries
that have the economic ability to negotiate pre-purchase orders. Conversely, indicated populations
in developing countries

which have been deeply affected by COVID-19

are likely to only be

able to access a disproportionately smaller number of vaccines doses. Given the global nature of
the pandemic, this split is inequitable towards populations in economically disadvantaged
countries. Moreover, this form of nationalism runs counter to public health and epidemiological
principles, which take a global (or at least transnational) approach to problems like COVID-19
rather than sovereignty-based responses to pandemics and epidemics.
Allocative problems like vaccine nationalism are not strictly intellectual property
problems. Nevertheless, they derive from the same siloed and proprietary approaches to
pharmaceutical innovation that intellectual property so often intensifies. As seen in Part IV.C, there
are ongoing efforts to curb vaccine nationalism, including the formation of a large-scale
procurement mechanism (COVAX) aimed at the global and equitable distribution of COVID-19

49

Id., ib.
Ewen Callaway, The Unequal Scramble for Coronavirus Vaccines By the Numbers, NATURE (Aug. 24, 2020).
51
Id., ib.
52
Id., ib.
53
CEPI, CEPI Survey Assesses Potential Covid-19 Vaccine Manufacturing Capacity (Aug. 5, 2020).
50
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vaccines.54 Several countries, however, have declined to join COVAX.55 Pursuant to its current
policy of international isolationism, the United States is one of these countries.

IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COLLABORATIONS
While the previous section documented different instances in which a silo mentality has
prevailed over collaborative endeavors in the response to COVID-19, the ongoing pandemic has
also originated a number of countervailing efforts aimed at fostering collaborations at the R&D
and distributive levels. Some of these collaborations resort to well-known mechanisms in
intellectual property history and practice (patent pools and pledges) to mitigate intellectual
property-induced inefficiencies.56 Others eschew purely nationalist approaches to the distribution
of medical technologies emerging from R&D performed during the pandemic through the creation
of tendentially global models to finance and allocate health goods (procurement facilities,
particularly in the field of vaccines).
A. PATENT POOLS
In March 2020, the government of Costa Rica submitted a proposal to the World Health
Organization for the creation of a patent pool designed to cover a broad range of medical
technologies:
This pool, which will involve voluntary assignments, should
include existing and future rights in patented inventions and
designs, as well rights in regulatory test data, know-how, cell
lines, copyrights and blueprints for manufacturing
diagnostic tests, devices, drugs, or vaccines. It should
provide for free access or licensing on reasonable and
affordable terms, in every member country.57
The World Intellectual Property Organization defines patent pool as an agreement
between two or more patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or to
54

Infra, Part IV.C.
See Donato Paolo Mancini & Michael Peel, Vaccine Nationalism Delays WHO s Struggling Covax Scheme, Fin.
Times (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/502df709-25ac-48f6-aee1-aec7ac03c759
56
See Parts IV.A and IV.B.
57
Letter from Costa Rica to the World Health Organization, Knowledge Ecology Int l (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/President-MoH-Costa-Rica-Dr-Tedros-WHO24March2020.pdf
55
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third parties.

58

Daniel Crane has aptly described patent pools as a form of intra-industry social

contract permitting the emergence from this Hobbesian war of each against all.

59

Patent pools

focused on health technologies, or segments thereof, are not a new figure in the international
landscape. 60 One of the largest and most well-known examples is the Medicines Patent Pool
(MPP),61 an organization created by Unitaid in 2010 to negotiate voluntary licenses for medicines
needed in lower-resource countries (HIV, hepatitis C and tuberculosis).62
In addition to constituting an early response to time- and demand-driven pressures on
COVID-19 R&D pipelines, Costa Rica s proposal was partly fueled by concerns that health
technologies emerging during the pandemic might be priced unaffordably for economically
disadvantaged populations.63 As implementation of the proposed patent pool began in the
following months, the World Health Organization further recognized that overreliance on
intellectual property-based modes of innovation was unlikely to result in equitable access to health
goods, even in periods of transnational public health crises:

58

WORLD. INTELL. PROP. ORG., PATENT POOLS AND ANTITRUST A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2014),
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf. See also generally Ryan
Lampe & Petra Moser, Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the Nineteenth-Century Sewing
Machine Industry, 70 J. ECON. HIST. 898 (2010); Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property
Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY, ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS ET AL. (EDS.) (2010); Carl
Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY
AND THE ECONOMY, VOLUME I (ADAM JAFFE ET AL., EDS.) (2001); Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing
Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 657, 660-661, 681-687, 700-706 (2010); Jean Tirole &
Josh Lerner, Efficient Patent Pools, NBER Working Paper No. w9175 (2002); Michael S. Mireles, An Examination
of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM, 141, 216-220 (2004).
59
Daniel A. Crane, Patent Pools, RAND Commitments, and the Problematics of Price Discrimination, in WORKING
WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY
(ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS ET AL., EDS.) (2010).
60
See Peter K. Yu, Virotech Patents, Viropiracy, and Viral Sovereignty, 45 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1563, 1599-1604 (2013)
(describing the SARS patent pool); Brook K. Baker, A Sliver of Hope: Analyzing Voluntary Licenses to Accelerate
Affordable Access to Medicines, 10 NORTHEASTERN U. L. REV. 226 (2018); Esther van Zimmeren et al., Patent
Pools and Clearinghouses in the Life Sciences, 29 TRENDS BIOTECH. 569 (2011).
61
Medicines Patent Pool, About Us, https://medicinespatentpool.org. See also Esteban Burrone, Patent Pooling in
Public Health, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
GOVERNANCE, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, MARGARET CHON ET AL., EDS. (2018); Krista L. Cox, The
Medicines Patent Pool: Promoting Access and Innovation for Life-Saving Medicines Through Voluntary Licenses, 4
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L. J. 293 (2012); Sandeep Juneja et al., Projected Savings Through Public Health Voluntary
Licences of HIV Drugs Negotiated by the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP), 12(5) PLOS ONE (2017).
62
UNITAID, The Medicines Patent Pool, https://unitaid.org/project/medicines-patent-pool/#en (last accessed Aug.
28, 2020).
63
See Ed Silverman, WHO is Asked to Create a Voluntary Intellectual Property Pool to Develop Covid-19
Products, STAT (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/03/24/covid19-coronavirus-costa-ricaintellectual-property/
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The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the fallibility of traditional
ways of working when it comes to equitable access to essential
health technologies. This initiative sets out an alternative, in line
with WHO s efforts to promote global public health goods, based
on equity, strong science, open collaboration and global solidarity.64
The COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) was rolled out in late May 2020.65 The
goals of C-TAP are manifold. It aims to promote and accelerate the public disclosure of
information critical to COVID-19 R&D through the sharing of gene sequencing research and
clinical trial results.66 It also advocates for the insertion of provisions into agreements mandating
equitable distribution of COVID-19 treatments, vaccines and other emerging products, as well as
the disclosure of clinical trial data.67 It seeks to promote the licensure of these products to both
large and small manufacturers and distributors. And, finally, it advocates for open innovation
models and technology transfer that increase local manufacturing and supply capacity.

68

Patent pools like C-TAP are designed to reduce the risk and transaction costs associated
with negotiating processes.69 Moreover, they can potentially help speeding up R&D timelines
through their signaling function: R&D players (from scientists to institutional representatives to
funders) know early on that a patent committed to the pool indicates that the underlying technology
or method can be licensed as opposed to substitutes or worked around.70
Yet, patent pools are not without drawbacks. Participation in a pool is voluntary, often
leading to limitations in terms of participants, their heterogeneity and the number and scope of
pooled patents.71 Additionally, patent pooling does not necessarily mean that distribution of, and
access to, emerging innovations will automatically occur on an equitable basis. Agreements
64

WORLD HEALTH ORG., Solidarity Call to Action: Making the Response to COVID-19 a Public Common Good,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/global-research-on-novel-coronavirus-2019ncov/covid-19-technology-access-pool/solidarity-call-to-action/, (last accessed Aug. 29, 2020).
65
WORLD HEALTH ORG., COVID-19 Technology Access Pool,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/global-research-on-novel-coronavirus-2019ncov/covid-19-technology-access-pool (last accessed Aug. 29, 2020).
66
WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 - 29 May
2020 (May 29, 2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-themedia-briefing-on-covid-19---29-may-2020
67
Id., ib.
68
Id., ib.
69
See Muhammad Zaheer Abbas, Treatment of the Novel COVID-19: Why Costa Rica s Proposal for the Creation
of a Global Pooling Mechanism Deserves Serious Consideration?, 7 J. L. & BIOSCI. 1 (2020). See Crane, supra note
59.
70
Id., ib.
71
See generally, Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543 (2015).
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between licensors and licensees might be silent on pricing and distribution issues, which in turn
might lead to the exclusion of indicated populations, especially in economically disadvantaged
areas of the globe.72
To date, thirty countries and several international organizations have joined C-TAP.73
While the numbers are somewhat encouraging, they showcase some of the inherent limitations of
patent pools. In particular, some of the most salient players in pharmaceutical R&D have been
reluctant to contribute patents to the pool.74 After having commented favorably on other initiatives
created to speed up COVID-19 R&D, the Director General of the International Federation of
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations, expressed his views on C-TAP: I don't quite see
what the new initiative adds.

75

Even against this backdrop, an important advantage of C-TAP is that it is part of a larger
effort by the World Health Organization and other institutional players in the international public
health space to break down R&D silos and expedite both the development and the distribution of
health goods needed to address the COVID-19 pandemic. In parallel with the formation of the
pool, the World Health Organization coordinated the creation and development of the Access to
COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, described as a global and time-limited collaboration to
accelerate the development, production and equitable global access to new COVID-19 essential
health technologies.

76

As described in Part IV.C, this collaboration is overseen by a network of

international organizations and public health-oriented private organizations, including the World
Health Organization, the Wellcome Trust, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the World Bank
group and the Global Fund.77 The ACT Accelerator is divided into four pillars: diagnostics,
treatments, vaccines and the strengthening of health systems.78
72

See e.g. Ana Santos Rutschman, How Vaccine Nationalism Could Block Vulnerable Populations Access to
COVID-19 Vaccines, THE CONVERSATION (Jun. 17, 2020), https://theconversation.com/how-vaccine-nationalismcould-block-vulnerable-populations-access-to-covid-19-vaccines-140689
73
UNITED NATIONS, COVID-19: Countries Support One-Stop Shop to Share Science and Research,
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/05/1065132 (last accessed Aug. 29, 2020).
74
Chris Dall, Pharma Execs Say Several COVID Vaccine Options Needed, CIDRAP NEWS (May 29, 2020). See
also Ed Silverman, The WHO Launched a Voluntary Covid-19 Product Pool. What Happens Next?, STAT (May 20,
2020) (noting that the pharmaceutical industry has dismissed the notion [of the patent pool], which underlies
concerns that such a project is unlikely to succeed without widespread involvement ).
75
Id., ib.
76
WORLD HEALTH ORG., The Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/access-to-covid-19-tools-(act)-accelerator
77
WORLD HEALTH ORG., The Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator,
https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator
78
WORLD HEALTH ORG., The Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator,
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As seen above, the United States has by and large chosen not to embrace collaborative
international frameworks in its response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office has nonetheless created a voluntary program

Patents 4 Partnerships

to

facilitate the licensure of patented technologies.79 In its current iteration, the initiative focuses on
technologies relevant to the response to COVID-19.80 These technologies encompass patented
products or processes related to the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of COVID-19, including,
for example, personal protective equipment, disinfectants, ventilators, testing equipment and
components thereof.

81

USPTO has made available a searchable platform

the IP Marketplace

Platform82 that provides access to a centralized list of patents and patents applications.83 As with
patent pools, this mechanism seeks to reduce transaction costs and speed up R&D efforts during
the pandemic. At the time of writing, there were over 300 patents listed as available for licensing.84
Neither the transnational patent pool model promoted by the WHO nor the more modest
experiment led by the USPTO have fully displaced instances of nationalism and silo problems
inherent to contemporary R&D processes. But these efforts especially C-TAP in its tendentially
global approach

illustrate the long-felt need for transactional intellectual property frameworks

that do not adhere to strictly proprietary worldviews. In particular, they underscore and seek to
address the tension between the nature of public health crises and scientific collaborations on the
one hand, and overly siloed R&D processes based on patent-protected health goods on the other.

B. PATENT PLEDGES
Another pathway to promote the use of patented inventions consists in the adoption of yet
another type of voluntary mechanism

the patent pledge.85 Unlike patent pools, which signal a

https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator
79
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, Patents 4 Partnerships,
https://developer.uspto.gov/ipmarketplace/search/patents
80
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, About the Platform, https://developer.uspto.gov/ipmarketplace/search/platform
81
Id., ib.
82
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., IP Marketplace Platform,
https://developer.uspto.gov/ipmarketplace/search/patents
83
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., About the Platform, https://developer.uspto.gov/ipmarketplace/search/platform
84
Id., ib.
85
Contreras, supra note 71.
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willingness to license proprietary technologies, patent pledges are structured around the nonassertion, or limited assertion or use, of patent rights.86 As Jorge Contreras explains
[patent pledges] are commitments made voluntarily by
patent holders to limit the enforcement or other exploitation
of their patents. They are made not to direct contractual
counterparties, but to the public at large, or at least to large
segments of certain markets. And they are made without any
direct compensation or other consideration.87
In recent years, patent pledges have become more common across several industries, from
the automotive industry to computer software.88 During the early stages of the COVID-19
pandemic, a group of legal scholars and scientists developed the framework for a COVID-specific
pledge.89 The Open COVID-19 Pledge (hereinafter the Pledge) was launched in March 2020 as a
commitment by holders of intellectual property to share their intellectual property for the purposes
of ending and mitigating the COVID-19 Pandemic.

90

Founding adopters of the Pledge included Facebook, Amazon, Intel, IBM, Microsoft,
Hewlet Packard and the Sandia National Laboratories.91 The Pledge quickly amassed a wideranging portfolio of patents. For instance, NASA has pledged a patent covering 3D-printed
respirators.92 Fujitsu has pledged a patent covering disease diagnosis through automated

86

Id., at 546.
Id., ib.
88
Id., at 545-546. See also Jorge L. Contreras, The Evolving Patent Pledge Landscape, CTR. INT L GOVERNANCE
INNOVATION (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.cigionline.org/publications/evolving-patent-pledge-landscape; Jonas
Fabian Ehrnsperger & Frank Tietze, Patent Pledges, Open IP, or Patent Pools? Developing Taxonomies in the
Thicket of Terminologies, PLOS ONE (Aug. 20, 2019); Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong to You (sic), TESLA
(Jun. 12, 2014), https://www.tesla.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you; Carey Gillam, Monsanto Extends Pledge
on Roundup Ready Soybeans, REUTERS (Jul. 8, 2010), https://www.reuters.com/article/monsantoroundup/monsanto-extends-pledge-on-roundup-ready-soybeans-idUSN0824689420100709
89
See Matthew Bultman, Scientists, Lawyers Create Coronavirus IP Pledge, BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/scientists-lawyers-create-coronavirus-ip-pledge
90
See OPEN COVID-19 PLEDGE, Frequently Asked Questions, https://opencovidpledge.org/faqs/ (last accessed Aug.
30, 2020).
91
Id., Make the Pledge to Share Your Intellectual Property in the Fight Against COVID-19,
https://opencovidpledge.org (last visited Aug. 30, 2020).
92
See Id., NASA-JPL-3D Printed Respirators (May 20, 2020), https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/05/20/nasa-jetpropulsion-laboratory/
87
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software.93 And Facebook has pledged U.S. patent 20190163794, which covers systems and
methods for the detection of contextual information indicative of misinformation.94
In addition to collecting and centralizing commitments from pledgors, the Pledge operates
by providing different types of licenses. Developers of the Pledge created a set of standard licenses
that ca be adopted on an as-is basis by pledgors.95 Additionally, the Pledge recognizes sets of
requirements that should be met by non-Pledge licenses deemed either compatible licenses or
alternative licenses vis-à-vis the terms of the Pledge.96
Standard licenses

for which there are two versions covering patents and copyrights and

one covering patents only address only essential contractual areas for technology licensure. They
cover only five domains: grant and scope; time limitation; regulatory exclusivity; defensive
suspension; and the inexistence of a warranty.97
Compatible licenses consist of licensing frameworks that provide a set of minimum use
permissions.

98

This group includes both pre-existing licensing frameworks that have been deemed

to be consistent with the Pledge, such as the MIT license99 and the Apache 2.0 license,100 and
licenses reviewed on a case-by-case basis and deemed to meet the overall requirements of the
Pledge.
Alternative licenses consist of licensing frameworks that do not fit the previous
categories, but which are nonetheless consistent with the Pledge.101 These include the Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license102 and GNU s GNU General Public
License.103 The Pledge has identified a set of terms that are not acceptable for a license to be
93

See Id., Fujitsu Faster Disease Diagnosis Using Computer Software (Jun. 3, 2020),
https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/06/03/fujitsu-faster-disease-diagnosis-using-computer-software/; U.S. PAT.
20200118682, Medical Diagnostic Aid and Method
94
See Id., Facebook Combating the Spread of COVID-19 Related Misinformation (Aug. 11, 2020),
https://opencovidpledge.org/2020/08/11/facebook-combating-the-spread-of-covid-19-related-misinformation/; U.S.
PAT. 20190163794, Contextual Information for Determining Credibility of Social-Networking
95
See e.g. Id., About the Licenses, https://opencovidpledge.org/licenses/ (last accessed Aug. 30, 2020).
96
Id., ib.
97
See e.g. Id., Open COVID License 1.0 March 31, 2020, https://opencovidpledge.org/v1-0/ (last accessed Aug. 30,
2020).
98
See e.g. OPEN COVID-19 PLEDGE, About the Licenses, https://opencovidpledge.org/licenses/ (last accessed Aug.
30, 2020).
99
See OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, The MIT License, https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT
100
See APACHE, Apache License, Version 2.0, https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
101
See e.g. OPEN COVID-19 PLEDGE, About the Licenses, https://opencovidpledge.org/licenses/ (last accessed Aug.
30, 2020).
102
CREATIVE COMMONS, Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0),
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
103
GNU OPERATING SYSTEM, GNU General Public License, https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html
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deemed consistent with the spirit of the Pledge.104 For instance, licenses cannot be granted
exclusively for non-commercial uses nor bear any kind of fees.105
This broad array of licenses allows pledgors to choose the specific contractual frameworks
that best fit their interests. For instance, standard license OCL-PC v1.0 (covering both patents and
copyrights) lasts until one year after WHO declares the COVID-19 Pandemic to have ended.

106

Standards license OCL-PC v1.1 (covering both patents and copyrights) and OCL-P v1.1 (covering
only patents) have the same default duration, but will not last beyond January 1, 2023, unless
otherwise extended by the Pledgor.

107

Pledgors may thus choose between an open-ended or a

specific term. Similarly, while standard licenses are silent on indemnification,108 other versions
may contemplate the possibility of requiring the licensee to indemnify the licensor for liability
directly attributable to the licensee s actions.

109

The breadth of health-related technologies encompassed by the Pledge, the multiplicity of
flexible licensing frameworks it offers and the compressed timeline in which it was implemented
set the Open COVID-19 Pledge apart from previous structured approaches to incentivize the
licensure of patented goods

and especially of health technologies in a period of public health

crisis. Perhaps more importantly, this effort shows how flexible licensing strategies can be used to
promote technology transfer in furtherance of public interest goals within the dynamics of
intellectual property. By maintaining their ownership interest while relaxing control of some of
the sticks in their bundle of rights, pledgors adopt a different intellectual property strategy for a
limited period of time that might result in the adoption of their technology

and potentially in

valuable contributions to public health.
The intrinsically limited duration of the Pledge means that it cannot be used to assist in the
pursuit of broader R&D purposes targeting pathogens likely to cause future pandemic or
epidemics. It does, however, provide a blueprint for the development of similarly structured efforts
in upcoming the inter-outbreak period.

104

See OPEN COVID-19 PLEDGE, About the Licenses, https://opencovidpledge.org/licenses/ (last accessed Aug. 30,
2020).
105
Id., ib.
106
See e.g. OPEN COVID-19 PLEDGE, Open COVID License 1.0 March 31, 2020, https://opencovidpledge.org/v1-0/
(last accessed Aug. 30, 2020).
107
See e.g. OPEN COVID-19 PLEDGE, OCL-PC v1.1, https://opencovidpledge.org/v1-1-ocl-pc/ (last accessed Aug.
30, 2020).
108
See, Open COVID License 1.0 March 31, 2020, supra note 106 (last accessed Aug. 30, 2020).
109
About the Licenses, supra note 95.
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C. POOLED PROCUREMENT
The COVID-19 pandemic has prompted the creation of the COVID-19 Vaccine Global
Access Facility (COVAX) to both finance the development of new vaccines and guarantee their
equitable distribution on a global level.110
COVAX is integrated into a larger scheme the vaccines pillar of the ACT Accelerator.111
This pillar is designed to coordinate the development and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines from
end-to-end. Three organizations oversee different segments of this end-to-end process. The
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), a public-private partnership that funds
vaccine R&D targeting emerging pathogens,112 coordinates the stages of development and
manufacturing of vaccine candidates.113 The World Health Organization is the main driver for
vaccine policy and allocative decisions.114 And Gavi, a public-private partnership traditionally
focused on the procurement of childhood vaccines for developing countries,115 operates at the
procurement and delivery-at-scale level.116
Overseen by Gavi, COVAX is a risk-sharing mechanism built into this network s
procurement strategy. Participation in COVAX is open to any country wishing to join, subject to
an advance commitment to purchase a certain amount of vaccine and a monetary or material
contribution (the latter taking the form of vaccine doses).117 In exchange, participating countries
receive access to COVID-19 vaccines procured by COVAX once they become available, at a price
negotiated between COVAX and individual pharmaceutical companies. 118 In early June, COVAX
entered into the first of these procurement agreements with AstraZeneca, securing access to 300
million doses of vaccine.119

110

See GAVI, COVAX, THE ACT-ACCELERATOR VACCINES PILLAR,
https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/document/2020/COVAX-Pillar- backgrounder_3.pdf
111
WORLD HEALTH ORG., The Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, https://www.who.int/initiatives/actaccelerator
112
COALITION FOR EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS INNOVATIONS [CEPI], Our Mission, http://cepi.net/about/whyweexist/
113
See GAVI, COVAX, THE ACT-ACCELERATOR VACCINES PILLAR, supra note 110.
114
Id., ib.
115
GAVI, About Our Alliance, https://www.gavi.org/our-alliance/about
116
GAVI, COVAX, THE ACT-ACCELERATOR VACCINES PILLAR, supra note 110.
117
Id., ib.
118
But see Ana Santos Rutschman, The COVID-19 Vaccine Race: Intellectual Property, Collaboration(s),
Nationalism and Misinformation, 64 WASH. U. J. L. & POL Y __ (forthcoming 2020) (draft on file with author)
(criticizing the current allocative policy adopted by COVAX).
119
GAVI, Gavi Launches Innovative Financing Mechanism for Access to COVID-19 Vaccines, (Jun. 4, 2020),
https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/gavi-launches-innovative-financing-mechanism-access-covid-19-vaccines
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In this way, COVAX uses the same type of legal instrument that enables nationalistic
allocation of vaccines pre-production contracts to further global governance of vaccines, while
diffusing risk through resource pooling and attempting to maintain relatively low vaccine prices.120
The swift formation of COVAX, and more broadly of the vaccines pillar of the ACT
Accelerator, also speaks to the limitations of intellectual property as a push mechanism in
incentivizing vaccine R&D. Moreover, COVAX denotes the need for complementary pull
mechanisms accompanying intellectual property incentives and curbing the excesses of overly
proprietary or nationalist approaches to pharmaceutical innovation, particularly during pandemic
and epidemic crises.

CONCLUSION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR THE NEXT PANDEMIC
Many of the current approaches to pharmaceutical innovation during pandemics and
epidemic rely on proprietary frameworks that are hard to reconcile with the public health demands
posed by transnational outbreaks of infectious diseases. The COVID-19 pandemic illustrates these
tensions through an accentuation of siloed modes of R&D, as well as the adoption of nationalistic
approaches to the allocation of emerging medical technologies. While reinforcing the case for legal
and policy changes ahead of the next pandemic, COVID-19 has provided a blueprint for
interventions that may curb some of these siloed trends.
These efforts

from patent pools and pledges to procurement mechanisms

are

nonetheless time-consuming and resource-intensive, in addition to being inevitably linked to
geopolitical considerations. As such, when started during a pandemic, they constitute remedial
modes of response, which are subject to accelerated timelines and practical constraints. Moving
forward, the international community should direct attention during the next inter-outbreak period
to the strengthening of some of these mechanisms

possibly turning some of the temporary

initiatives described above, such as COVAX or pandemic patent pools, into more permanent
structures.121 These developments are needed not only to save time when the next pandemic
occurs, but also to increase notions of equity and to promote dialogue centered on equity issues
ahead of (inevitable) future crises triggered by emerging pathogens.
120
121

Rutschman, The Reemergence of Vaccine Nationalism, supra note 4.
See Halabi & Rutschman, supra note 47.

21
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3691239

